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CROSS-EXAMINATION TO IMPEACH
Few phases of the law of evidence present such a maze of
confused and arbitrary rulings as cross-examination to impeach.
Most courts, we are told, have taken the view that the limits
of this type of investigation are in the discretion of the trial
judge.' But this does not apply in every jurisdiction to all
' 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 983. For recent pronouncements
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kinds of questions tending to discredit.2  Nor is it possible in
any jurisdiction to predict with much confidence when a review-
ing court will hold that this discretion has been abused.2
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has at least
made such prediction more certain than it has been in that
state hitherto.4 In Conzrmonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N. E. 839 (Mass.
1926) the court holds that as long as the evidence admitted has
a degrading tendency, there can be no abuse of discretion. No
other inference is possible.5 The cross-examination in this case
was as broad as could well be imagined. The defendant, on
trial for murder in a hold-up, was asked about his love of
money; his love of this country; his information relative to the
charitable activities of Harvard; his knowledge of the number
of school children in Boston; his subscription to anarchist
of the rule see Lamb v. State, 20 Ohio App. 461, 152 N. E. 678 (1926);
Grose v. State, 149 N. E. 722 (Ind. 1925); Shores v. Simanton, 130 Atl.
697 (Vt. 1925) ; Middleton v. State, 162 Ark. 530, 258 S. W. 995 (1924).2 WIGAIOE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 373, showing that the judge's dis-
cretion may cover the relevancy of the questions, or their policy, or both.
Compare also the varying rules as to arrests, indictments, etc. mentioned
infra.
3 Compare Stanley v. State, 235 S. W. 17 (Ark. 1920) with Daniels v.
State, 168 Ark. 1082, 272 S. W. 833 (1925); State v. Scott, 194 Iowa, 777,
190 N. W. 370 (1922) with State v. Burris, 198 Iowa, 115G, 19S N. W.
82 (1924); Taylor v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 285 S. W. 1012 (Blo. App.
1926) with Asadorian v. Sayman, 282 S. W. 507 (Mo. App. 1926); People
v. Buzzi, 238 N. Y. 390, 144 N. E. 653 (1924) with People v. Kasprzylz,
209 App. Div. 449, 204 N. Y. Supp. 786 (4th Dept. 1924).
-WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 983, note 5, lists Massachusetts as
forbidding inquiry into collateral misconduct on cross-examination. III §
987, page 397, n. 1, he shows that up to 1921 Massachusetts varied betwNeen
that rule and that of the judge's discretion. The cases since Wigmore
wrote, however, indicate definite adoption of the discretionary rule. See
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 152 N. E. 704 (Mlass. 1926); Commonwealth
v. Sansone, 252 Mass. 71, 147 N. E. 574 (1925); Commonwealth v. Getti-
gan, 252 Mass. 450, 148 N. E. 113 (1925); ef. Commonwealth v. Vanden-
hecke, 248 Mass. 403, 143 N. E. 337 (1924). JoNEs, EVMENCE (2d ed.
1926) § 2364 seems to include Massachusetts among the states forbidding
this type of cross-examination; but see § 2365, n. 2.
S The words of the Sacco case supports this inference; so do its facts.
The cross-examination in Commonwealth v. Homer, 235 Mlass. 520, 127
N. E. 517 (1920) and in Sullivan v. O'Leary, 146 Mlass. 322, 15 N. E. 775
(1888) was not so broad as in the principal case. Yet the action of the
trial court was held error. Hence it may be concluded that Massachusetts
is now willing to a greater extent than formerly to commit the outer limits
of cross-examination to the judge. As indicated infra note 11, the great
majority of states following the discretionary rule have reversed on
narrower cross-examination than that in Commonwealth v. Sacco.
6 The questions as given in 151 N. E. at 856 are:
"Is your love for this country measured by the amount of money you
can earn here? What is the reason you came bach from Mexico if you
did not love money then? Don't you Imow Harvard University educates
more boys of poor people free than any other university in the United
States of America? . . . . . . . Don't you lmow :hat each year there are
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papers; the coincidence of his views with those of a named
anarchist; his avoidance of conscription; and whether he was
a man who would tell the jury that the United States was a dis-
appointment to him.0 The Supreme Court says: 7 "These quds-
tions as well as the questions relative to the effect on his wife of
his possible arrest and deportation for participation in move-
ments inimical to the government, were within the rule that a
witness may be cross-examined in the discretion of the judge
to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility, or to shake his
credit by injuring his character, and for this purpose his way
of life, his associations, his habits, his prejudices, his physical
defects and infirmities, his mental idiosyncrasies, if they affect
his capacity, his means of knowledge, powers of discernment,
memory and description may all be relevant."
This rule interpreted literally,8 as it was here, may make
prophecy 'as to what an appellate court will do more definite
and sure. But it is submitted that this literal interpretation is
one from which almost all courts theoretically following the
same rule have withdrawn in dismay, and that it is an interpre-
tation which in the present state of American jurisprudence,10
at least, may lead to the conviction of defendants for crimes
which they never committed.
scores of them that Harvard educates free? Did you intend to condemn
Harvard College? Were you ready to say none but the rich could go there
without knowing about offering scholarships? Do you know how many
children the City of Boston is educating in the public schools free? Do
you know it is close to one hundred thousand children? And do you sub-
scribe to any papers? Was the printing of that paper stopped during
the war? Was the printing of Le Mortelle stopped durng the war? Were
they anarchistic papers? Were any of the books that were in your house
anarchistic? Were you aware of his views-Fruzetti's views-with respect
to anarchy? Did you know what they were, yes or no? Were you afraid
of deportation yourself on May 5th? Did you find out from him what he
thought, what his views were with respect to anarchy? Were your views
with respect to anarchy substantially the same as Fruzetti's? As far as
you understood Fruzetti's views were yours the same, and you are a man
who tells this jury that the United States of America is a disappointment
to you? Are you, Mr. Sacco? Well, tell us about how disappointed you
were, and what you did not find and what you expected to find. Are you
that man? Why did you tell me a falsehood that on Thursday, the day
before you read the account in the paper, you worked all day? And in
order to show your love for this United States of America when she was
about to call upon you to become a soldier you go away to Mexico? Mr.
Sacco, that is the extent of your love for this country, isn't it, measured in
dollars and cents?"
7 151 N. E. at 856.
8 This interpretation is made only in cases where the judge has some dis-
cretion. The illogical character of the rule as to female witnesses as
stated in Commonwealth v. Vandenhecke, supra note 4, is clear. So of the
Massachusetts rule as to legal charges of crime, mentioned infra.
9 See cases cited inf'a note 11.
10 See WIGMORE, loe. cit. supra note 1: "If the discretion allowed by the
preceding rule were properly exercised; if there existed at the American
Bar in general that skill and professional self-restraint in cross-examination
which is traditional at the English Bar; if there existed among the Ju-
diciary the desire and tLe courage to check excesses of cross-examination
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Apparentry the Massachusetts court is now prepared to hold
that the discretion of the trial judge can not be abused as long
as the questions asked tend to show that the witness has not
the same social, economic, and political background as the aver-
age juror. Few other courts have gone so far. Somewhere in
the decisions of almost every state which intrusts to the trial
judge control over cross-examination to impeach is found an
express or implied limitation on that control.1 And that limita-
tion normally appears when the examination would lead rather
and to err if at all on the side of repression; and if the Judiciary were
accustomed to exercise their powers fully and freely, there could be no
better solution than to vest the control in that discretion. But the Judiciary
today are not always inclined to show to the abuses of crosz-examination
the disfavor which those abuses deserve. . . . For this reason, as
well as because of the usual unprofitableness of cross-examination to
character, there is something to be said in favor of the rule that now
obtains in several jurisdictions, by which such misconduct is forbidden to
be inquired into at all. The rule of total prohibition of crosZ-examina-
tion . . . on these matters, has thus received sanction, and is perhaps
the one most consonant with the needs of the time."
- Trenton Potteries Co. v. United States, 300 Fed. 550 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924), certiorari granted, 266 U. S. 597, 45 Sup. Ct. 96 (error to allow
witness in Sherman Act case to be asked whether he did not kmow his
firm had pleaded guilty to a violation of the act; and whether he did not
know one with whom he dealt was under investigation by the Lockwood
Committee); Stanley v. State, supra note 3 (error to permit proof on
cross-examination that accused had shot two other men); State v. Scott,
supra note 3 (error to allow cross-examination of accused as to whether
he was named after Robert E. Lee; if he had Indian blood; if he hilled a
man in Arkansas; if he lay in wait to kill another; if he pointed a revolver
at certain persons or cursed a certain woman); Forsyth v. Nostrand, 201
Mich. 558, 167 N. W. 1002 (1918) (cross-examination as to other con-
tracts); State v. Miller, 151 Blinn. 386, 186 N. W. 803 (1922) (error to
allow cross-examination as to threats to kill others, even though accused
had said he thought deceased was one Bowman and that he kmw of no
other enemies); Raee v. State, 73 Neb. 732, 103 N. W. 438 (1905) (error
to permit cross-examination of defendant to domestic relations); People v.
Buzzi, supra note 3 (error to allow cross-examination of defendant and
her sisters as to immorality of another sister, and to permit questions to
defendant as to fights with her husband and the wife of the deceased);
People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 61, 134 N. E. 836 (1922) (error to allow cross-
examination of defendant as to imprisonment as soldier in France); State
v. King, 204 N. W. 969 (N. D. 1925) (robbery--error to allow crozs-exam-
ination of accused as to gouging out one man's eye and shooting another, al-
though this evidence was stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it) ;
Gabler v. State, 243 Pac. 981 (Okla. Cr. App. 1926) (in liquor prosecution
error to allow cross-examination of accused giving the impression counsel
knew he made and sold liquor); State v. Bingham, 131 S. E. 603 (S. C.
1926) (error to allow cross-examination as to other homicides); State v.
Cottrell, 56 Wash. 543, 106 Pac. 179 (1910) (in forgery error to allow
cross-examination as to other frauds); Dungan v. State, 135 Wis. 151, 115
N. W. 350 (1908) (error to allow cross-e-xamination of defendant as to
wife's immorality).
See also the statements in State v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 So. 725 (1910)
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to arousing prejudice against the witness as a member of society
than to pointing to the probability of falsehood in his story."
The line between these two tendencies is difficult to draw, go
difficult that in Massachusetts the attempt has now been almost
wholly abandoned. Yet the result of failure to draw it here
was that the Commonwealth was allowed to ask, at a time of
intense popular feeling against anarchists and all opposed to
the established order, questions emphasizing in a picturesque
and telling manner the political views of a defendant on trial
for a crime which admittedly had not the slightest relation to
those views.
The artificial character of the divisions of this subject is
illustrated by another point in the same case.13 A state's wit-
ness was asked whether he was not a defendant in a criminal
case in this court. The question and answer were excluded.
When the defense announced that it had in its possession the
records of a larceny case where the witness had pleaded guilty,
the case had been filed, and the defendant given probation, the
court declined to allow cross-examination on the point because
the case had been filed. This ruling is held correct because
there had been no conviction. But who can doubt that being a
defendant in a criminal case to the layman injures the character,
and is under the logic of the Sacco case admissible to injure it?
And if this is true, is not a plea of guilty to a charge of larceny
at least as relevant to credibility as a knowledge that "Harvard
College educates more boys of poor people free than any other
university in the United States of America" ? 14
(questions must have legitimate bearing upon credibility); Annarina v.
Boland, 136 Md. 365, 380, 111 Atl. 84, 89 (1920); Territory v. Chavez,
8 N. M. 528, 532, 45 Pac. 1107, 1108 (1896); Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St.
178, 183 (1881); State v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 296, 43 S. E. 160 (1903) (de-
grading questions should rarely be tolerated).
12 The cases cited supra note 11 indicate the outer limits of the judge's
discretion. Inner limits are set in the following: State v. Poston, 199
Iowa, 1073, 203 N. W. 257 (1925) (error to decline to permit cross-
examination of prosecutrix in rape as to whether she had not suffered from
melancholia and accused others of assaulting her); Taylor v. Conn. Fire
Ins. Co., supra note 3 (error to exclude cross-examination of plaintiff in
action on policy as to relations with man not her husband); Wadlington
v. Coyne, 207 N. W. 539 (S. D. 1926) (error to exclude questions to
plaintiff as to use of assumed name where issue depended wholly on his
veracity). The power of the judge to exclude testimony relevant to truth-
fulness is apparently greater in Massachustts than in many other states.
See Commonwealth v. Sansone, and Commonwealth v. Vandenhecke, supra
note 4.
13151 N. E. at 851.
14 Here the literal interpretation mentioned in note 8 supra is not made.
If almost anything tending to diminish the witness in the eyes of the jury
can be admitted, what difference does it make from what kind of facts the
diminution arises? Some special method of proving convictions may of
COMMENTS
Perhaps Dean Wigmore's tentative suggestion is the only
solution: to forbid cross-examination of this kind.'2 Still it
does not seem necessary to advocate so extreme a measure. In
State v. Schleifer, a case in some respects similar to this, the
Connecticut court reaffirmed its rule that cross-examination on
matters not relevant to veracity is improper. While the discre-
tion of the judge may cover the period and extent, "the question
of relevancy," the court said, "is never within the discretion
of the trial court." 17 In the principal case the questions asked
had no bearing on veracity. If they had been excluded, and
only such examination permitted as would have affected the
truthfulness of the witness, the state would not have been un-
duly restricted, nor the defendant able to claim prejudice.
What should be required as proof of a conviction when used
to impeach is beyond the scope of this paper. It may be sug-
gested in passing that the record of a plea of guilty would seem
to be as conclusive of guilt as the verdict of a jury and the
sentence of a judge.-s Whatever may be the case in other juris-
course be required. But if the sole question is whether the question will
degrade the witness, it would seem that arrests, indictments and trials, to
say nothing of pleas of guilty, should logically be admitted. Some courts
following the discretion rule decline to draw any distinction betwern these
types of degradation, and admit legal charges and confessions of crime
in the discretion of the judge. Pillow v. State, 160 Ark. 195, 254 S. W.
462 (1923); cf. Taylor v. State, 169 Ark. 589, 276 S. W. 577 (1925);
Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1899); Denny v. State, 190
Ind. 76, 129 N. E. 308 (1921) ; Livingston v. Heck, 122 Iowa, 74, 94 N. W.
1098 (1903); State v. Winters, 241 Pac. 1083 (Kan. 1926) (although the
better rule is that an unproved charge should not be investigated); State v.
Thompson, 108 So. 543 (La. 1926); Territory v. Chavez, oup az note 11;
State v. Jeffreys, 135 S. E. 32 (N. C. 1926); State v. Bacon, 13 Or. 143, 9
Pac. 393 (1886); Messer v. Commonwealth, 133 S. E. 761 (Va. 1926). Sea
also cases collected in JONES, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2371, n. 12.
IS Supra note 10. Elliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65 (1857) is the leading case
for this view. See also Woodward v. State, 19 Ala. App. 577, 99 So. 156
(1924); People v. Adams, 244 Pac. 106 (Calif. App. 1926) (under Calif.
C. C. P. § 2051) ; People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 204, 135 N. E. 422 (1922) ;
State v. Carson, 66 Mie. 116 (1876); State v. Jenldns, 66 Alont. 359, 213
Pac. 590 (1923); Curtis v. State, 284 S. W. 950 (Tex. Cr. App. 1926);
State v. Thorne, 39 Utah, 208, 117 Pac. 58 (1911). See also Idaho Comp.
Stat. (1919) § 8038; but cf. State v. Fung Loon, 29 Idaho, 248, 158 Pac.
233 (1916) that the provision does not cover examination to a degrading
occupation.
'1S 102 Conn. 708, 130 Atl. 184 (1925) (In a prosecution for solicitation,
on cross-examination of the defendant, the court allowed the state to
introduce letters showing that while serving the government he had
preached anarchy among shipyard employees. Held, error.)
' 102 Conn. at 715, 130 Atl. at 188. See also State v. Schutte, 97 Conn.
462, 117 Ath 508 (1922).
3. The rules as to the meaning of conviction for impeachment purposes
have been much affected by the rules as to the meaning of conviction to
disqualify. In the latter case the tendency was to restrict incompetency
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dictions, Massachusetts can hardly justify giving the narrowest
possible range to the shortest and simplest method of impeach-
ment, a conviction, and the widest possible range to the most
protracted and dangerous method, cross-examination to an un-
conventional past.
R. M. H.
THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OF REMOVAL
The Constitution vests the power of appointment in the Presi-
dent, subject to the consent of the Senate,' but is silent on the
power of removal, except in its provisions regarding impeach-
ment.2 It is well settled, however, that, at least in the absence
of restrictive legislation, the President has power to remove his
appointees, where their tenure is not fixed by the Constitution2
Moreover, statutory limitations do not affect the President's
power of removal, when exercised by and with the consent of
wherever possible. Consequently, a judgment without sentence, a con-
viction in another state, and a conviction followed by pardon did not
disqualify. Faunce v. People, 51 Ill. 311 (1869); Logan v. United States,
144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617 (1892); Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S.
450, 12 Sup. Ct. 292 (1892). Impeachment presents no such struggle
against an arbitrary rule. The aim is simply to find an adequate basis for
holding that a witness has committed a crime which under popular notions
discredits him. Hence conviction in another jurisdiction is admissible.
Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N. E. 407 (1922). So
is a conviction from which an appeal is pending. Treadway v. State, 235
Pac. 929 (Okla. Cr. App. 1925). Contra: Foure v. Commonwealth, 214
Ky. 620, 283 S. W. 958 (1926); State v. Shelton, 284 S. W. 433 (Mo.
1926), Blair, C. J., Atwood, and White, JJ., disagreeing with the opinion
on this point, and Graves, J., dissenting generally. Nor will a pardon make
the conviction inadmissible. State v. Serfling, 131 Wash. 605, 230 Pac. 847
(1924). In line with this tendency, some courts have held that a plea
of guilty though not followed by fine or imprisonment is sufficient proof of
guilt for impeachment purposes. State v. Merrell, 263 S. W. 118 (Mo.
1924) ; People v. Cardinelli, 297 Ill. 116, 130 N. E. 355 (1921). The atti-
tude of the court toward the Probation Act, § 2, is explained in People v.
Andrae, 295 Ill. 445, 129 N. E. 178 (1920); People v. Jacobs, 238 Pac. 770
(Calif. App. 1925). Contra: Remington v. Judd, 186 Wis. 338, 202 N. W.
679 (1925) (on a plea of nolo contendere followed by dismissal). Where
the plea of guilty is followed by sentence, a fortiori the same result occurs.
Coles v. McNamara, 241 Pac. 1 (Wash. 1925). The only important dif-
ference of opinion here seems to be as to the effect of sentence on a plea
of nolo contendere. The conflict is illustrated by Collins v. Benson, 81
N. H. 10, 120 Atl. 724 (1923) excluding the evidence and State v. Radoff,
248 Pac. 405 (Wash. 1926) admitting it. See (1926) 14 GEOR(EToWN L.
J. 297.
1U. S. CONST. Art. II, § 2.
2 U. S. CONST. Art. II, § 4.
3 See Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 259 (U. S. 1839); Wallace v.
United States, 257 U. S. 541, 544, 42 Sup. Ct. 221, 222 (1922).
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the Senate.4 And the Senate by confirming the appointment of
a successor, is considered as having concurred with the Presi-
dent in the removaM It is also settled that where Congress has
exercised its constitutional power to vest the appointment of
"inferior" officers in the heads of departments, it may determine
the method of their removal." The question remains, however,
whether Congress has power to make the consent of the Senate
a condition of removals by the President.7
Until 1863 this supposed power was never exercised. In 1789
the fast Congress, by a small majority in the House S and by
the deciding vote of Vice President Adams in the Senate," voted
not to grant the power of removal to the President, since he
already had it.' The vote was then regarded as a legislative
declaration that the power to remove officers appointed by the
President with the consent of the Senate was vested in the Presi-
dent alone." Provisions by the same - and later 3 Congresses
for removals at the President's pleasure were made not in denial,
but in recognition of this construction," which went unques-
tioned until the increase in removals with the inauguration of
the "spoils system" about 1830.1 It was not, however, until
1863 that Congress abandoned its earlier decision by maldng the
removal of the Comptroller of the Currency subject to the con-
sent of the Senate.-' But this departure went unnoticed until
it was incorporated in the legislation resulting from the quarrel
between President Johnson and the Republican Congress over
-M Military and naval officers. Keyes v. United States, 109 U. S. "UN, 3
Sup. Ct. 202 (1883); Mullan v. United States, 140 U. S. 210, 11 Sup. Ct.
788 (1891). Civil officers. See Parzons v. United State-, 167 U. S. 024,
343, 17 Sup. Ct. 880, S86 (1897).
5 Wallace v. United States, 258 U. S. 296, 42 Sup. Ct 318 (1922).
6 United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 6 Sup. Ct. 449 (1380).
"The question has been expressly saved." See Wallace v. United Statez,
supra note 3, at 545, 42 Sup. Ct. at 222.
S 29-22. (1789) 1 ANNALS oF CONGRESS, 614.
9 C. F. ADA s, WORKS OF JOHN ADAS (1365) 450.
1.0 The vote was taken on a bill establishing the Department of Foreign
Affairs, and concerned the removal of the Secretary of Foreign Agairs. 1
Stat. 29 (1789).
1 5 MARsHALL, LwE OF WASHINGTON (1807) 200; 1 KENT, Cozirinu'xAns
(1826) *310; STORY, CONsTrruTiON (1833) *§ 1543.
12 1 Stat. 87 (1789).
133 Stat. 582 (1820).
14 For this interpretation, see Parsons v. United States, Mpra note 4,
at 339, 17 Sup. Ct. at 885.
15 On Mar. 23, 1830, Barton's resolution asserting the power to require
the President to report to the Senate his reasons for removals was reported
in the Senate. In 1835 the proposal was embodied in the Executive Patron-
age Bill -which passed the Senate on two successive occasions, but failed
of action in the House. See (1830) 6 Cong. Deb. 458; (1835) 11 Cong.
Deb. 440.
1612 Stat. 666 (1863).
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the reconstruction of the southern states. The Tenure of Office
Act of 1867,17 passed over the President's veto, applied the re-
moval clause to all presidential appointees, including heads
of departments. Its purpose was to deprive the President of
the control of federal patronage, and it was particularly designed
to prevent the removal from office of Secretary of War Stanton.
Two years later, when partisan anger subsided, the, act was
modified, 8 and in 1887 it was totally repealed. 19 But in 1872
the removal clause was unobtrusively re-enacted respecting post-
masters,20 and has remained in the statutes ever since.
It was under this legislation 21 that the recent case of Myers v.
United States, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (U. S. 1926) arose. On July 21,
1917, Myers was appointed first class postmaster at Portland,
Oregon, for a term of four years. On February 2, 1920, he was
removed from office by direction of the President, after he had
refused to comply with a demand for his resignation. His re-
moval was never approved by the Senate. On April 21, 1921,
Myers brought suit for his salary from the date of removal to
the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against
him because of delay in suing." In affirming this judgment,
the Supreme Court denied laches, but held that the President
has exclusive power to remove executive officers appointed by
him with the consent of the Senate. 23
This decision is ostensibly based on the legislative construction
of 1789, and the reasons then advanced by Madison in its sup-
port. It is argued that the appointment and removal of offi-
cials are executive prerogatives included in the grant to the
President of "the executive power," 24 that this power is subject
only to limitations expressly stated, and that though the Consti-
tution provides restrictions in respect to appointments, it con-
tains none in respect to removals. To this seemingly sound con-
struction, the dissent makes an equally convincing reply: that
the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish certain "in-
ferior" offices, among which postmasterships are included, and
that the power to create involves the power to prescribe the
tenure and the conditions when incumbency shall cease. These
17 14 Stat. 430 (1867).
18 16 Stat. 6 (1869).
1) 24 Stat. 500 (1887).
2G 17 Stat. 284, (1872) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 568.
21 19 Stat. 80, (1876) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 7190 provides that
"postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and
may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate and shall 'hold their offices for four years unless sooner re-
moved or suspended according to law."
22 58 Ct. Cl. 199 (1923).
23 The majority opinion is by Mr. Chief Justice Taft; Holmes, McReynolds
and Brandeis, J. J., dissenting.
24 U. S. CONsT. Art. II, § 1.
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arguments present merely a choice between conflicting implica-
tions. The history of legislative interpretation seems equally
inconclusive. The original construction was made at a time
when Congress considered it desirable for removals to be made
by the President alone, and it did not long survive this view.
Except as regards cabinet officers, the interpretation expressed
in the removal clause of 1863 has since prevailed.
The decision in the Myers case has been criticized for having
as its real basis political expediency.25 But this factor seems to
have been the controlling one in congressional interpretation,
and seems now to afford the only substantial ground for judg-
ment. The question remains, however, whether the recent de-
cision is expedient. It is argued that the exclusive power to re-
move subordinates is indispensable to the President if he is to
be held responsible for efficient administration. - But executive
responsibility in the absolute sense prevailing in parliamentary
governments does not exist in the United States, v.ith its system
of periodic elections. And as the dissent suggests, the danger
of inefficiency and insubordination can be adequately provided
against by implying in the President the power of suspension.
Moreover, the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted,
not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The transfer of the power of removal from the Presi-
dent alone to the President and the Senate might not effectively
prevent removals for political reasons, - but it at least would be
a check on arbitrar-y and capricious action. While it seems de-
sirable that the President should be able to remove members of
his own Cabinet, it does not follow that he should have unre-
strained power to remove "inferior" officers such as members
of administrative commissions, or his appointees in the army
or navy.2 s Their judgment should not be influenced by the possi-
bility of summary removal in case of a difference of opinion
with the President. Such, however, is the effect of the decision,
unless Congress vests their appointment in the courts of law
or in the heads of departments. -" The decision may be justified
on the ground that it preserves the status quo, 5 and at the same
time leaves Congress a loophole. But the adoption of this alter-
native would only lead to a further diffusion of responsibility.
22 The Supreme Court as Revolutionary, THE NATION, Nov. 10, 1920, at
468.
26 (1789) 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 480; see Fairlee, Tkc Administrativc
Powers of the President (1903) 2 MiCu. L. REv-. 190, 201.
27 Fairlee, op. cit. supra note 26, at 200.
2S Powell, Spinning out the Er:ecutire Power, TE NEW REdPLMLIC, Nov.
17, 1926, at 369.
29 United States v. Perkins, supra note 6.
so "The principle is vague but the practice is certain: the President may
remove his appointees." BEARD, AMERICAN GOVENMENT AND POLITIcS
(1911) 193, n. 1.
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DEFERRED SETTLEMENTS IN LIFE INSURANCE-
"TRUSTS" OR "DEBTS"
The dangers attending the investment of considerable sums of
nioney in the hands of inexperienced beneficiaries has in recent
years led most life insurance companies to provide plans for
safeguarding life insurance funds by various methods of post-
poned payment.1 Forms for typical methods of deferred settle-
ment are provided in particular cases, but many modifications
of these methods are made, and special clauses may be drawn
in order that the peculiar needs of the beneficiary according to
age, wealth, environment or otherwise may be satisfied.
Such a special arrangement was involved in the recent case
of Cronbach v. Cronbach.2 Joseph Cronbach procured the Aetna
Life Insurance Company to issue eight policies insuring his life,
each policy being for the sum of $5,000. Under a reserved
power to change the beneficiary, the insured procured the com-
pany to change the beneficiary clauses of these policies to pro-
vide that upon the death of the insured the company was to
retain the net sum ($40,000) and pay to the wife and daughter
of the insured monthly interest at the rate of 30/100 of 1%
($120 per month, 3.6% annually) without the rightof withdrawal
of any part of the principal sum by the wife or daughter until
1 These plans of deferred settlement, known as "optional methods of
settlement," commonly include an arrangement whereby the money may be
left on deposit and interest paid to the beneficiary, either for life with
remainder over to another beneficiary, or, at the will of the beneficiary,
conditioned on other circumstances fitted to the need of the particular case.
Another option commonly provided is for the transmutation of the proceeds
of the policy into installments, either for a specified term of years or for
the entire life of the beneficiary. In practice, however, numerous modi-
fications of these plans are made.
Two methods of providing these settlements are in use. (1) By a fidu-
ciary contract. By indorsement, the beneficiary of the policy is made the
X Insurance Company, Fiduciary. Then the insured signs a request for a
fiduciary contract, the company issues the contract at its home office and
mails it directly to the insured. The agreement of the company is to
hold and dispose of what proceeds it shall receive as beneficiary. This
method is in use by only a few companies. (2) By a policy or settlement
agreement. When informed of a policyholder's wishes, a request em-
bodying the mode of payment is prepared and submitted for his approval.
When signed and returned, an agreement containing the dispositionary
parts of the request is prepared, executed by the company and attached
to the policy. Tuis method is in general use by most insurance companies.
The above is based upon a statement of such plans contained in a recent
book. HORTON, THE CONTROL BY AN INSURED OF THE PROCEEDS OF HIS
PoLIciEs (1926). Many of the cases cited infra are there collected.
2 Decided in Tennessee in 1926. The decision here discussed is that of
the chancellor in the court below. The case on appeal is reported in
Cronbach v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 284 S. W. 72 (Tenn. 1926). See infra
note 3.
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the expiration of a period of twenty years from the death
of the insured. Thereafter it was to be optional with the wife,
if living, otherwise with the daughter, to continue to receive
interest without the right of withdrawal of any part of the
principal sum, or to elect payment of the principal sum, less
unearned interest, if any, in installments payable during twenty
years, without the right of commutation of installment pay-
ments by the wife or daughter. Upon the death of both bene-
ficiaries, the principal sum less unearned interest, if any, or
the commuted value of any unpaid installments, as the case
might be, was to be payable to persons designated by way of
remainder.
Before his death, the insured had made a parol expression
of intention to change the beneficiary clause. Upon his death,
suit was brought by his wife to have this last wish of the de-
cedent given effect so as to make her the sole beneficiary of
the policies and to permit her to receive payment in a lump
sum; or if this could not be done, that the insurance company
be ordered to pay the principal sum of $40,000 into the registry
of the court, or to some bank or trust company to be selected,
so that a greater sum by way of interest might be realized.
The chancellor before whom the case arose denied the first de-
mand on the ground that the attempted change of beneficiary
was invalid. In his discussion of the second demand, the chan-
cellor assumed that the insurance company was a trustee, and
denied relief on the ground that there had been shown no vio-
lation of the trust, and that the greater security afforded the
principal and interest under these provisions, effectuating the
inItent of the insured, justified a rate of interest lower than
might ordinarily be secured.
Plans for the payment of insurance proceeds in other than
one sum immediately upon the death of the insured, although
now of frequent occurrence and of increasing importance in
the life insurance business, are so new that their nature, so far
as appears, has not as yet been the subject of judicial deter-
mination. It is therefore surprising to find the chancellor as-
suming, without any discussion, that the arrangement in the
Cronbach case created a trust.3  It is proposed to consider
whether there is justification for such a view, and whether the
relationship set up between the insurance company and the
beneficiary of a deferred settlement policy should be treated as
one of trustee and cestui que trust, or merely as one of debtor
and creditor.
3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennezsee contented itzelf v'ith a
discussion of the attempted change of beneficiary, and made no mention
at all of the trust issue. It does not appear that either of the parties
raised this issue on appeal. The assumption by the chancellor of the ex'dst-
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The jural consequences of a set of operative facts which have
previously been determined as creating a "trust" or a "debt"
have been fairly well delimited.4 Likewise the factors govern-
ing the choice of concepts have frequently been laid down. Yet
the cataloguing of these facts into one group or the other has
often been a matter of great difficulty in practice.5 Thus it is
elementary that every trust must have specific property as its
subject matter, and that the existence of a trust fund is es-
sential to the existence of a trust. Superficially, this would
seem to determine the issue raised, since the custom and usage
of the insurance business makes it clear that the insurance
company does not segregate a particular fund for the payment'
of a particular beneficiary. That the matter cannot so easily
be disposed of is due, on the one hand, to the peculiar nature
of the insurance contract,7 and on the other, to the considera-
tion that in certain instances some courts have not hesitated
to depart from the accepted rules of trusts for the purpose of
reaching a result which to them seemed desirable.
ence of a trust is likewise due probably to the fact that both parties were
interested in having the transaction labelled as a trust, and argued the
case on this assumption.
4 These consequences may generally be summarized as follows: (1) A
trustee occupies a fiduciary relation, and his obligation is ordinarily
enforceable only in equity, while a debtor is not a fiduciary, and his obli-
gation is ordinarily enforceable in a court of law. (2) Loss without fault
by a trustee is excused. [But the responsibility of a fiduciary for the
preservation of the fiduciary res may be increased by the terms of a bond
or other special undertaking given by him. Smythe v. United States, 188
U. S. 156, 23 Sup. Ct. 279 (1903). See dissenting opinion in Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. Bartlett, 120 Ill. 603, 11 N. E. 867 (1887); COSTIO, ,
CASES OF TRUSTS (1925) 87, n.] A debtor may be responsible irrespective
of fault. (3) In case of bankruptcy, the cestui can take from the assets
of the bankrupt trustee the specific trust property if he can identify it.
In case of debt, the creditor must share pro rata. (4) The Statute of
Limitations, if applicable, does not begin to run against a trustee until
he has repudiated the trust obligation. Against a creditor's claim it be-
gins to run from the maturity of the debt. (5) A trustee will be guilty
of embezzlement if he converts trust funds to his own use. A debtor
has no funds which can be the subject of conversion. See BOGERT, TRUSTS
(1921) c. 2.
5 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 18.
6 Finlayson, P. J., in Ex Parte Lamb, 61 Calif. App. 331, 328, 215 Pac.
109, 112 (1923): "To the creation of a trust, a trust res or subject mat-
ter is a sine qua non." Dunn, 5., in Marble v. Marble's Estate, 304 Ill.
229, 240, 136 N. E. 589, 594 (1922) : "It is always necessary to a trust
that there shall be a particular piece of property or a certain fund to
be held or dealt with in a particular manner for the benefit of another."
See also Gough v. Satterlee, 32 App. Div. 33, 40, 52 N. Y. Supp. 492,
497 (2d Dept. 1898); BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 3; Long, The Defi-
nition of 'a Trust (1922) 8 VA. L. REv. 426.
7 ". . . Insurance is not, as is sometimes hastily assumed, a mere
application of Contracts and Agency, but is a separate subject, having
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The peculiarity of the insurance agreement is exemplified in
the situation which the beneficiary occupies. As a third party
beneficiary of a contract, his rights might properly have been
held to be destructible by the mutual agreement of the two prin-
cipal parties. Yet it is well recognized that his rights are
"vested" and indefeasible.' Probably the theory of a declara-
tion of trust by the insured " best describes the result, and such
a theory has been found helpful in the solution of some difficult
problems in insurance law.'0 It may be harmonized with ortho-
dox trust rules by considering the trust res as the claim against
the insurance company which the insured holds for the benefit
of the third party. Some courts, adopting this theory, do not
discuss the question as to who the trustee is;" others consider
the insured as the trustee.1-2 There appears to be no case, how-
ever, which treats the insurance company as the trustee. 3 Yet
this is the relationship which must be assumed to exist before
the arrangement under a deferred settlement may be treated
as a trust.
The objection to considering the transaction as creating such
a relationship lies in the fact that to do so would violate the
orthodox trust principles that an obligor may not be the trustee
of his own obligation," and that an identifiable res is essential
peculiar doctrines of its own. . . " WAZIBAUGH, CASES ON INSLU-NCE
(1902) Preface; see Wilson v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 90 VL 105,
109, 96 Atl. 540, 542 (1916).
sFor an analysis of the legal relations involved see (1925) G4 Y,%L
LAW JOURNAL, 533.
9 See Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest lu a Life Insurzancc Policy (1922)
31 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 343.
20 Thus, where the beneficiary predeceased the insured, some courts have
held that the insured had the right to designate a new bEneficiary on the
theory of a lapsed trust. Vance, op. cit. supra note 9, at 356. And where
the beneficiary murdered the insured, it was held that a trust reZulted to
the representatives of the insured. Ibid.; see (1926) 35 YALE LAIW Jour-
NAL, 759.
11 Pingrey v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374, 11 N. E. 562 (187);
Small v. Jose, 86 Me. 120, 29 Atl. 976 (1S93); Schmidt v. Northern Life
Ass'n, 112 Iowa, 41, 83 N. W. 800 (1900).
22 Kerr v. Union Mutual Co., 69 Hun, 393, 23 N. Y. Supp. 619 (Sup.
Ct. 1893); Fuchs v. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 N. Y. Supp. 105
(Sup. Ct. 1917). See (1911) 24 HAnv. L. RIlv. 227.
13 A writer on the subject has made the statement that "The beneficiary
is regarded as the cestui que trust and the insurance company as the
trustee of the fund represented by the policy of which the insured may be
regarded as the grantor." Robbins, Vested Interest of a Bencficiary Un-
der a Policy of Life Insurance (1901) 53 CENT. L. J. 184. The statement
is made as a suggestion of the attitude which should be takhen in dealing
-with the problems suggested, supra note 10. No cases are cited, and there
is no discussion of the trust problems which would be involved in such a
view.
14 See Samuels v. Drew & Co., 296 Fed. 882, SS7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924);
397
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to the existence of a trust.15 It may therefore be helpful to
consider two somewhat analogous situations in which both
of these tenets have been disregarded.
A direction given by a creditor to his debtor to pay a third
person, when assented to by the debtor, has been held by some
courts to make the debtor a trustee for the third person.10 In
some of these cases the rights of third party creditors were
not involved,1 and the result may be explained on the theory
that, as between the beneficiary and the obligor or his assignees
or representatives, it would be inequitable to allow the latter to
deny his responsibility. Others arose in jurisdictions where a
third party beneficiary had no standing in court,s and the re-
sult is an attempt to obviate the harshness of this rule. It seems
clear that in this class of cases the rule that an obligor may
Glovin v. De Miranda, 76 Hun, 414, 419, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1049, 1052 (1st
Dept. 1894); Marble v. Marble's Estate, supra note 6.
1 See cases cited supra note 6.
le, See SCOTT, CASES ON TRusTs (1919) 48, n. 2.
17 Eaton v. Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55 (1874); Central Trust Co. v. Burke,
1 Ohio, Nisi Prius, 169 (1895) ; Brogan v. Public Trustee, 34 New Zealand,
817 (1915). In Re Leigh's Estate, 186 Iowa, 931, 173 N. W. 143 (1919)
L declared that he held $8,000 in trust for trustees of a church; he made
a note for this amount, which the payees receipted and returned to him.
No money was ever transferred, and no fund set apart. The court al-
lowed recovery of the $8,000 against the personal representative of L on
the theory that L was trustee of this amount. In Day v. Roth, 18 N. Y.
448 (1858) the so called cestui was allowed to recover as against the
debtor and his transferee with notice; the result may be explained on
the theory of a constructive trust imposed because of fraud on the part
of the defendants. Where the relation of debtor and creditor exists, an
agreement by the debtor recognizing the claim, and specifying particular
property to be held by the debtor for the benefit of the creditor is suffi-
cient to create a trust, at least as between the immediate parties. Hamer
v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (1891) ; Butler v. Weeks, 12 Misc.
192, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1090 (Sup. Ct. 1895). See (1923) 9 VA. L. REV. 235.
is For a citation of cases see SCOTT, loc. cit. supra note 16; ANSON, CON-
TRACT (CoRBIN'S ed. 1919) 335, n. 4. And see McFadden v. Jenkyns,
1 Phil. 153 (Ch. 1842); Moore v. Darton, 4 De G. & S. 517 (Ch. 1851).
But see In re Caplen's Estate, 45 L. J. R. 280 (1876) and note in
CoSTIGAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 152. In Murray v. Flavell, 25 Ch. D.
89 (C. A. 1883) a partnership agreement provided that, upon the dis-
solution of the partnership by the death of one of them, the executors
or administrators of the deceased partner should be entitled to receive
out of the net profits of the partnership business an annuity to be applied
as such partner should by deed or will direct for the benefit of his widow
and children, and in default of such direction to be paid to such widow,
if living, for her own use. It was further provided that the annuity
should be constituted a charge on the net profits of the business. Ono of
the partners died insolvent, without having given any direction as to
the payment of the annuity. The court held that the annuity did not
form part of the testator's estate, but that by the articles a trust of it
was created in favor of the widow, and that she was entitled to it
free from the claims of the testator's creditors. See 13 HALsauRY, LAWs
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not be the trustee of his own indebtedness was overlooked by
these courts in an attempt to reach a result seemingly desir-
able. 9
Again, where a person makes a deposit of money with no in-
tention of having the identical money set apart or used, but
with instructions that a similar amount is to be used for some
specific purpose, an application of orthodox trust rules would
necessitate considering the relationship created between the de-
positary and depositor as that of debtor and creditor, the debt
being payable to another. This is the result reached by the
English courts.20 In this country, however, the great majority
of the courts have reached an opposite conclusion, and have
given the specific depositor priority over general creditors in
the event of the insolvency of the depositary.2  The reasons
given for reaching this result have not been uniform. Some
courts have treated the specific deposit as a special deposit, 2-
the bank therefore not being entitled to mix the money deposited
with its own, but being obligated to keep it separate to carry
out the specific directions. This assumption is in direct conflict
with accepted banking practice. -3  Others have held that an
agency relation was created.24 Some courts treat the transac-
tion as creating a strict trust, disregarding the fact that there
is no res upon which to found the trust.' Generally, the result
OF ENGLAND (1910) 97. The court here raised a trust under an ordi-
nary partnership agreement in which the res did not come into e::ietcnce
until the death of the partner. See Davis, Spendthrift Tr-w3tf in Life
Insurance (1925) 5 BOSTON U. L. REv. 91, 95. The decision was quez-
tioned in Ehrmann v. Ehrmann, 72 L. T. R. 17 (1894) where on a similar
state of facts it was held that no immediate trust was created, but that
it was a trust to arise in the future, and would attach only upon the
then existing assets. See 22 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra, at 51.
19 "Equity did not shrink from expanding the concept of a trust to
cover the case of a contract beneficiary." Note by Corbin in A:;so:;, lec.
cit. supra note 18. See Corbin, Contracts for the Bzcfit of a Third Per-
son (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1003; Williston, Contracts for the
Benefit of a Third Person (1902) 15 HARV. L. Rv. 767.
20 In re Barned's Banking Co., 39 L. J. Ch. CO5 (1S70). Whcre, how-
ever, the bank procures a particular fund to be set apart for mecting the
obligation, the bank becomes trustee. Farley v. Turner, 20 L. J. Ch. 710
(1857).
2: See COSTIGAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 124.
22 Massey v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958 (C. C. Pa. 1S94) ; First Nat'1 Bank v.
Propp, 198 Iowa, 809, 200 N. W. 428 (1924); People v. City Bank of
Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32 (1884). The cases are collected in CosnIGAN, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 125.
23 See Stone, Some Legal Problems Involvcd in the Transnnson of
Funds (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 507.
24 Southern Exch. Bank v. Pope, 152 Ga. 162, 108 S. E. 551 (1921);
State v. Farmer's Bank, 110 Neb. 676, 194 N. W. 805 (1923); Johnson v.
Whitman, 10 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 111 (N. Y. 1S71).
2 Mitchell v. Bank of Indianola, 98 Bliss. 658, 54 So. 87 (1911) ; Lebanon
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is based upon some feeling that a specific deposit is of a higher
nature than a general deposit.26 Where the transaction involved
transmission by cable, recent cases have held that merely a
debtor-creditor relationship was created.27 This result, perhaps
reached because it was harder to imagine a dealing with a
specific res, may be evidence of a tendency back to the normal
trust rule. The significant fact remains that the great majority
of our courts have glossed over the difficulty of the absence of a
res in order to reach a result which to them seemed desirable.
The objection to this treatment is really based likewise on con-
siderations of policy, the desirability of the result being ques-
tioned. 28
Precedent exists, then, for applying trust principles to a trans-
action lacking the usual trust features if a sufficient reason in
policy for so doing be found. Other objections to such a treat-
ment of deferred settlement plans are not insurmountable, and
may be disposed of more easily by viewing the arrangement as
really constituting two transactions. During the life of the
insured it would seem clear that the insurance company is
acting in the same capacity in the deferred settlement cases as
it is in cases of lump settlement, and that there is no basis for
considering the insurance company as trustee during this period.
On the death of the insured, insurance functions end, and the
new relation which the company assumes is very similar to
Trust Co. & Safe Deposit Bank's Estate, 166 Pa. 622, 31 Atl. 334 (1895).
See (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 583.
2 See Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902). It
has been suggested that the "trust relationship" which the courts speak
of in the specific deposit cases consists in the giving, in effect, of an
equitable lien on the assets in favor of the specific depositor. COSTIGAN,
loc. cit. supra note 22. Another suggestion is that the relation is akin to
that in the American grain elevator cases, where the depositor of grain
is a tenant in common of the mass. See (1922) 6 MINN. L. REV. 306;
(1925) 23 MIcH. L. REv. 532.
27 Legniti v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. E. 597
(1921); American Express Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 249,
132 N. E. 26 (1921); Carmen v. Higginson, 245 Mass. 511, 140 N. E.
246 (1923); Gellert v. Bank of California, 107 Or. 162, 214 Pac. 377
(1923). Contra: State v. Grills, 35 R. I. 70, 85 At]. 281 (1912). Soo
Stone, loc. cit. supra note 23; (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 177.
28 Two other banking transactions which some courts have treated as
trusts though there was no identifiable res may be mentioned. (1) Whore
a draft restrictively endorsed "for collection and remittance" is deposited
with a bank, and the bank makes the collection, some courts have hold
that the bank is trustee of the proceeds. Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Mills-
paugh, 275 S. W. 579 (Mo. App. 1925); Murray v. North Liberty Sav-
ings Bank, 196 Iowa, 729, 195 N. W.' 354 (1923). Criticism of this
result is based upon the same grounds as in the specific deposit cases.
See (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 627; (1923) 72 U. PA. L. REV. 56.
(2) Where a deposit made by A in a savings bank is changed to one for
"A and'B" or for "A or B," a few courts have held that the bank be-
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that of a banking or trust company. In the case of an unfunded
insurance trust, the procedure is for the insurance company, upon
the death of the insured, to turn the proceeds over to the trust
company, which holds them for investment. -29 And it has been
held that the trust company may deposit the trust fund in its own
savings department.C In the case of deferred settlements in
policies of insurance, the insurance company, instead of v.ith-
drawing the amount of the claim from its assets and paying
over such assets, retains this amount in its general assets, where
it is already invested, although not as an ear-marked fund.
Money left for investment is usually treated as a trust fund.'&
But the payment of interest has been held to negative the exist-
ence of a trust and to be evidence of a mere contract relation,
since it contemplates the use of the funds.-2 This objection goes
to the failure to segregate, and if the analogy of the specific
deposit cases is accepted, the objection may be disregarded here
as it was in those cases.
Another unusual feature of the plan is the payment of a fixed
rate of interest. A trustee must not derive any profit from
the trust,33 and if the rate provided is a maximum rate, the earn-
ings of the trustee might be entirely disproportionate to the
services rendered. In the Cronzbach case there is a provision
that the principal sum is to be repaid less uncarncd bztci'st, if
any. It seems also that it is customary for mutual companies
to provide that if the fund earns more than the stipulated rate
of interest, a correspondingly greater amount will be allowed.31
It has been held that a trustee may fix the income rate to the
comes a trustee. Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 Calif. 19, 54
Pac. 370 (1898). See note in Costigan, op. cit. sup ' note 4, at 299; but
cf- Molera v. Cooper, 173 Calif. 259, 160 Pac. 231 (1910); (1910) 4
CALIF. L. REV. 167.
29 See HERRICK, TRUST DEPART.AE.NTS IN BAxIzs ND Tnusr COwA:;iEm s
(1925) 225. The legality of unfunded insurance trusts secms not to be
questioned. See Bogert, Funded I2strancc Trusts and the Rule Agefint
Accumulations (1924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 113. The legality of funded insur-
ance trusts is still in doubt. Ibid.; and see authorities cited in HnE-R=C, op.
cit. supra at 230, n. 2.
3 Tucker v. New Hampshire Trust Co., 69 N. H. 187, 44 Atl. 927 (1897)
(result, however, probably due to statutes involved); Herzog v. Title Guar-
anty Co., 148 App. Div. 234, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1114 (1st Dept. 1911), -Fl'd
210 N. Y. 531, 103 N. E. 885 (1913) (deposit of income from trust property
as it accumulated; not a deposit of the principal of a trust fund); In re
People's Trust Co., 169 App. Div. 699, 155 N. Y. Supp. 639 (2d Dept. 1915).
31 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 24.
321n re Broad, 13 Q. B. 740 (C. A. 18S4); Pittsburgh Nat'l Banl: v.
McMurray, 98 Pa. 538 (1881); BOGERT, loc. cit. supra note 31.
3 See Frost, Rights of Trustees to Derive Indirect P'oflts ftom the
Handling of Trust Funds (1921) 6 VA. L. PEG. (N. S.) 041.
3 Thus the piactice of the Aetna Life Insurance Company is to pay in
addition to the 314% interest guaranteed such excess interest as may be
determined by the proper company officials. At the present time interest
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beneficiary above a specified minimum23 It may also be argued
that the business of mutual life insurance companies is not con-
ducted for the purpose of creating profits, and that the trust
fund is not therefore being used in the trustee's own business."
Basically, then, the issue resolves itself into a consideration
of whether a sufficiently compelling policy exists to warrant a
court in disregarding normal trust requirements in dealing with
deferred settlements of life insurance proceeds. It is doubtful
whether such a policy can be found in the Cronbach case. As-
suming the solvency of the insurance company, the contract
theory fully protects the beneficiary and carries out the inten-
tions of the insured. In case of insolvency, the beneficiary would
only be entitled to share as a general creditor, and would have
no claim for a preference. It would seem that the insured in
taking out this policy was relying on the insurance company
as such, and it cannot be inferred that there was a clear in-
tention to create a trust. And it is doubtful whether the policy
of granting priorities is desirable where the effect would be to
deprive other creditors, many of them in the same class as this
beneficiary except for the fact that their interest matures sooner,
from a proportional share in the assets.
A more persuasive case for applying trust principles to de-
ferred settlement plans arises where the intention of the in-
sured to rely on the existence of a trust is clearly expressed.
This element would seem to be present in cases where a provi-
sion against alienation by way of a spendthrift trust is in-
corporated in the policy.3 7 In jurisdictions where spendthrift
trusts are upheld as serving a useful public policy, it would
seem desirable to uphold such a clause; a result which cannot be
reached, in the absence of a statute, if the relationship
is considered merely that of debtor and creditor. The policy of
permitting insurance companies to act in such a case as trustees
of a spendthrift trust has been recognized by statute in Penn-
sylvania38 and Wisconsin, "9 where it is provided that the insur-
paid on proceeds left with the company under deferred settlement plans
is at the rate of 4.8%.
35 Herzog v. Title Guaranty Co., supra note 30; In re People's Trust
Co., supra note 30; Clapp v. Emery, 98 Ill. 523 (1881).
8 See HORTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45.
37 See Davis, Spendthrift Trusts in Life Insurance (1925) 5 BOSTON
U. L. REv. 91. It does not appear from the report of the Cronbach case
that such a provision was contained in the policy there involved. Nor
does it appear which if either of the methods of settlement mentioned
supra note 1 was used.
38 Pa. Stat. 1920, § 12264: "Whenever under the terms of any annuity
or policy of life insurance, or under any written agreement supplemental
thereto, issued by any company incorporated by, and doing business in
this State, the proceeds are retained by such company at maturity or
otherwise, no person entitled to any part of such proceeds, or any in-
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ance company shall not be required to segregate insurance pro-
ceeds retained by it. -o Statutory enactment should not be nec-
essary to accomplish the result if the court is convinced of its
desirability. It would seem, though, that a preferable solution
would be to recognize that no trust as such exists, but that
rights of a similar nature have been created for the purpose of
meeting the needs of the particular situation. The insurance
arrangement is so nearly unique in other respects that the adop-
tion of a peculiar rule confined to a particular and well defined
situation would not materially disarrange accepted concepts so
as to prevent their application to other situations controlled by
different policies.
THE DECLARATORY ACTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
Declaratory actions and judgments are comparatively new in
this country. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts should
give novel or unusual interpretations to statutes authorizing
such actions and judgments, especially when the issuance of
such judgments is left to judicial discretion. But in England,
whence our statutes have been derived, the discretion has been
largely hardened into rule, and is subject to appellate review.
Nearly fifty years of British experience enable us, therefore, to
measure and circumscribe the exercise of judicial discretion by
established criteria and precedents.
In the recent case of Loeseh i. Ma .hattan Life Ias. Co., the
New York Supreme Court" dismissed an action for a declara-
tory judgment on the ground that the plaintiff could have sued
for damages in an action for breach of contract. Rule 212 of
the New York Rules of Practice, carrying out section 4'73 of
stallment of interest due or to become due thereon, shall be permitted
to commute, anticipate, encumber, alienate, or assign the same, or any
part thereof, if such permission is expressly withheld by the terms of
such policy or supplemental agreement; and if such policy or supplemental
agreement so provides, no payments of interest or of principal shall b2
in anyway subject to such person's debts, contracts, or engagements, nor
to any judicial processes to levy upon or attach the same for payment
thereof; and, further, that such company shall not be required to scgre-
gate such funds, but may hold them as a part of its gcneral corporat2
funds."
39' Wis. Laws 1923, c. 111.
40 The adoption of such a rule generally would undoubtedly lead to a great
ecxtension of insurance business in a field now occupied by trust compa-
nies, and the taking over of trust company functions as distinct from
insurance functions proper. The desirability of such a result should be
an important element in a judicial determination of the nature of the
relationship involved.
3New York Supreme Court, Spec. T. Part IV, Cotillo, J., 76 N. Y. L. J.,
No. 42, Nov. 20, 1926.
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the Civil Practice Act, authorizes the court to decline to render
a declaratory judgment if, in its opinion, "the parties should
be left to relief by existing forms of actions." Inasmuch as
the court appears to have relied upon a quotation from 28
YALE LAW JOURNAL in thus limiting the function of the declara-
tory action,2 it seems proper to suggest that the court has mis-
interpreted the scope of the remedy by deeming it an exclusive
remedy applicable to certain situations only, instead of ac-
cepting it, as the British precedents clearly demonstrate, as an
alternative remedy, applicable to practically every situation.
The New York court is not the first thus to mistake the scope
of the declaratory judgment.3
The facts in the case before the court were as follows: A
life insurance company (the defendant) made a contract with
an agent (the plaintiff) in 1913 giving him exclusive control
of the territory in New York City. According to the plaintiff,
the contract as amended, was not terminable by the company
until 1928. The agent was to receive compensation by commis-
sions decreasing from 50 per cent in the first, to five per cent
in the fifteenth year, on premiums obtained through him. If
the contract remained in force more than fifteen years the
company was to pay the agent three per cent on renewal pre-
miums during the continuance of the contract; if terminated
presumably before the fifteenth year, the renewal premiums
were to be collected by the company, deducting therefor two
per cent from any commissions due the agent. The company
discharged the agent in 1926. The agent, apparently denying
the validity of the discharge, and claiming that he is under
commitments to third persons which require him to know what
2 "Its purpose is to afford security and relief against uncertainty and
doubt. It does not necessarily presuppose culpable conduct on the part
of the defendant, but it enables any party whose rights, privileges, powers
or immunities, whether evidenced by a written instrument or not, have
beei disputed, endangered, threatened or placed in uncertainty by an-
other person, to invoke the aid of a court to obtain an authoritative de-
termination or declaration of his rights or other legal relations." (1918)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1, 4. The court gave no effect to the important
word "necessarily."
3 See In re List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129 Atl. 64 (1925) in which the
court suggested, by way of dictum, that the declaratory action could only
be employed when no ordinary form of action was available and that
the main purpose of the declaratory procedure was to insure a speedy
determination of issues "which would otherwise be delayed, to the pos-
sible injury of those interested, if they were compelled to await the or-
dinary course of judicial proceedings." There is no authority in the
history of declaratory procedure for such an unusual conclusion. See
also Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii, 420 (1923) in which the court refused
to try by declaratory action the conflicting 'claims of title to office by two
sets of officials in a fraternal society, on the ground that quo warranto
proceedings should be brought.
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his rights are, asks for a declaration of his right not to have
the company deduct the two per cent from his commissions and
of the company's duty to pay him three per cent on renewal
premiums after the fifteenth year. The issue apparently turned
on the single question whether the company was privileged to
discharge the agent, and like most judgments, it would have
determined the legality both of past and future conduct. The
court declined to make the declaration requested, on the ground
that the agent could have brought an action for an "anticipa-
tory" (?) breach of contract under existing forms of procedure.
In our opinion, the court should not have declined the declaration
on such a ground.
The Civil Practice Act, which closely follows the English
Order XXV, rule 5, of 1883, provides that the Supreme Court
shall have power "in azy action or proceeding to declare rights
and other legal relations . . . whether or izot further re-
lief is or could be claized." " These words have a history. The
Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, section 50, gave the English
courts the power to make declarations of right "without grant-
ing consequential relief." The courts of equity narrowed the
power greatly by construction, and finally almost emasculated
it by asserting that such declaration would only be made as an
incident to coercive relief or where there was a "right" to
consequential relief for which the plaintiff had merely chosen
not to ask.5 It was the desire completely to dissociate the power
to issue a declaration from the professed requirement of the
existence or non-existence of any further coercive relief which
induced the amendment of 1833 authorizing declarations
"whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not."
In England, therefore, the utmost freedom prevails in institut-
ing actions either for coercive relief, such as damages or in-
junction, or for a declaration of rights merely, or combining
the two. The advantage of the latter procedure, as pointed
out elsewhere, is that where a request for an injunction is com-
bined with a request for a declaration, the injunction may for
technical reasons be denied, and yet the declaration issue, thus
subserving the important purpose of the action by determining
the rights of the parties.
The narrow construction given to the Civil Practice Act by
the New York Supreme Court in the instant case closely re-
sembles the limited power given the courts of British India by
the Specific Relief Act of 1887, section 42, which, while malting
4 Italics ours.
5 See Rooke v. Lord Kensington, 2 K. & 3. 753, 760 (Ch. 1856); 23 YA~I
LAw JounNAL, at 27. This view of the scope of the declaratory judgment
would have resulted in a declaratory judgment in the Loesch caze.
628 YALE LAW JOURNAI, 105.
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it unnecessary for the plaintiff to be entitled to any coercive
relief, bars the courts from making declaratory decrees only in
cases where the plaintiff, being able to seek coercive relief, fails
to request it.7 This also was the early construction of the Ger-
man Supreme Court 8 and reflects the existing German practice,
which requires a plaintiff to seek his most drastic remedy, over-
looking the advantages of arbitration or friendly submission
over hostile litigation and personal enmity in having one's legal
relations determined.
The New York court appears to have been misled into be-
lieving that the declaratory action lay only where no coercive
relief could be claimed by the clause in rule 212 permitting the
court to decline a declaration if the court believed "the parties
should be left to relief by existing forms of action." This re-
quires explanation, whether or not one agrees with the court
that the agent should have brought an action for breach of
contract. If it meant that a declaration should not be issued
if coercive relief was obtaiiable in an existing form of action,
as the court evidently assumed, then the rule would practically
nullify the clause in the Act itself, "whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed." This obviously contemplates
that a declaratory action may be brought notwithstanding the
fact that coercive relief might also have been claimed. But
the doubt is removed by the practice in England when other
remedies are available. The only occasions when the declaratory
judgment is declined because of the existence of other reme-
dies is when a special statutory proceeding exists for dealing
with the very type of case submitted for declaration, or where
jurisdiction has been conferred on some special tribunal.9 There
have been cases where the court has felt that the relief sought
could best be obtained by some other form of action, but this
has been applied to cases in which the court was asked to de-
clare the invalidity of a tax law or of an assessment under
such law, and the court believed that the claimant could ade-
quately try the question in a defense against enforcement pro-
7 Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act contains this proviso: "Provided
that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being
able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do
so." CoLLETT, THE LAW OF SPECIFIC RELIEF IN INDIA (1882) 224; SAuKAR,
THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT (4th ed. 1922) 169; SARAI, TuE CIVIL PROCE-
DURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) (1895) §§ 11, 283; 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
at 29.
8 German Supreme Court, 4 R. G. 437 (1881). This decision was so
severely criticized by Bahr, one of the draftsmen of the code of civil proce-
dure, that the court later reversed its position. See the development of
the practice in 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, at 16-20.
9 Money expended on public works recoverable only in a court of sum-
mary jurisdiction. See Barraclough v. Brown [1897] A.C. 615, 623; Grand
Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hampton U. D. C. [1898] 2 Ch. 331; Bull v.
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ceedings.10 The court's discretion is necessarily guided by the
expediency of issuing a declaration, . e., whether it will serve
a useful purpose, whether it will remove the uncertainty or
settle the controversy or enable the parties to adjust their con-
flicting claims. The mere fact that another remedy exists is
no ground at all, of itself, for refusing the declaration. The
English and Colonial courts regard the declaratory relief as an
alternative remedy,1' and where a regular action and a declara-
tory action might both lie, give the plaintiff his choice. The
inference that by permitting a declaratory action where a
stronger action might lie, litigation is increased, is not con-
firmed by experience. Both the German and the English courts
once feared this, but the apprehension has admittedly proved
unjustified. On the contrary, the narrowing of the issue and
the tendency to avoid technicalities of pleading have diminished
litigation; and it has practically never been necessary, after a
declaratory judgment defining the rights of the parties, again
to resort to the court for a further coercive decree.
The declaratory judgment is of course often involed, and
serves perhaps its most effective purpose, in cases where no
coercive relief is possible-for example, in the interpretation of
written instruments before breach or violation or injury, or
generally to remove uncertainty and doubt from legal relations
that are disputed, threatened or placed in uncertainty by ad-
verse claims. But to regard this, while the more strildng, as
the exclusive function of the declaratory judgment is a grievous
error, and would be bound to hamper the growth of this form
Att'y Gen. of N. S. Wales [1916] 2 A. C. 564. Claims for excrnption from
military service. Flint v. Att'y Gen. [1918] 1 Ch. 21G. Jurisdiction over
claims for exemption from taxation given to Board of Assezzment. Ncw
York & Ottawa Ry. v. Cornwall, 29 Ont. L. R. 522 (1913). Invalidit,
of a patent triable by petition for revocation. N. E. Marine Enginccring
Co. v. Leeds Forge Co. [1906] 1 Ch. 324. See also 23 Y=x~ LAW JOUB:IAL,
at 114.
It is of course necessary to sue for a declaration in a court having
jurisdiction over the subject-matter in controversy. Thus, a questioned
title to real estate under a will should have been tried in the law, not
chancery, court. Paterson v. Currier, 93 N. J. Eq. 48, 129 Atl. 711 (1925) ;
Wight v. Board of Education, 133 Atl. 3S7 (N. J. 1926); In re Gooding's
Will, 124 Misc. 400, 203 N. Y. Supp. 793 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
- Toronto Ry. v. City of Toronto, 13 Ont. L. R. 532 (10); Ottawa
Y. BM. C. A. v. Ottawa, 29 Ont. L. R. 57-1 (Ont. App. Div. 1913); Att'y
Gen. for Queensland ex rel. Goldsborough v. Commonwealth, 20 Com. L.
R. 148 (Austr. 1915).
u For example, instead of suing out a petition of right against the
crown, it is becoming common to ask a declaration of rights. Dyson v.
Att'y Gen. [1911] 1 K. B. 410; Burghes v. Att'y Gen. [1911] 2 Ch. 139;
China Mutual Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Blaclay [1913] 1 K. B. 03;
cases discussed in ROBINSON, PUBLIC AUTHORITMS Aw n Lrcu.L LmAnirzv
(1925) 266-271.
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of relief. In the instant case, the insurance agent wished by
the declaratory judgment requested, to have an authoritative
guide for his commitments to third parties and it would seem
that in thus removing uncertainty, a useful purpose would have
been served. But even if an actin for damages would equally
have served, there was no justification, on that ground alone,
it is submitted, for refusing a declaratory judgment. In the
declaratory action, practically the whole issue could have been
determined, with possibly an accounting to follow. Even the
amount of damages, if such are claimed, could be determined by
declaration, with the aid of a jury if requested. Had the com-
pany refused to carry out the judgment a further coercive de-
cree would have been a mere formality. Why compel the most
drastic and extreme remedy, when the milder declaration of
rights will fully satisfy the plaintiff's requirements? Why pre-
fer a hostile campaign with irreparable breach of friendly re-
lations to the more amicable method of arbitration of conflicting
views of the law and the clarification of uncertainty? The mere
fact that the wrongful act complained of had already been com-
mitted and that another form of action was therefore available
has not been deemed in England or in most of our states a legiti-
mate ground for declining to decide the rights of the parties
by declaratory judgment. Self-restraint, the willingness to in-
voke arbitration and declaration of rights instead of hostilities
and coercion is a mark of civilization, and should be encouraged,
not discouraged. To conceive of the declaratory judgment as
if it were an extraordinary legal remedy like mandamus or
habeas corpus, or even an exceptional remedy like injunction,
not grantable when an ordinary remedy is available, involves
a serious mistake. It is not supported by history or precedent,
and its perpetuation by further decisions would impair the
valuable social function which the declaratory procedure was
designed to perform.
E. M. B.
DOMICIL OF CHOICE-FIXED RULES
In order to determine the law relating to change of domicil1 in
any state or country, it is essential to scrutinize what the courts
have actually done and are now doing even more carefully than
the principles they enunciate or the formal explanations of
1 Domicil affects: (a) status, such as legitimacy, adoption and divorce;
(b) transfer by act of law of a personal estate as a whole, as for instance
at death; (c) the incidence of personal taxes; and (d) judicial juris-
diction. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT No.
1 (1925) § 10.
COMMENTS 409
their decisions.2 Even a cursory reading of the cases will show
that, although the courts of the various states profess to decide
the cases which come before them according to "the rule" of
their jurisdictions, there is at least as much variance in the
interpretation of any state rule as there is between the rules
adopted by the several states.3 In a single state such as Con-
necticut, the courts have, at times, stated as requirements for
a change of domicil, actual residence in a new place with the
intention of remaining permanently; - residence with either the
absence of an intention to remove elsewhere or the presence of
an intention to remain for an indefinite period,5 or actual change
of residence with the dual intention of abandoning the old home
and maldng either a new permanent home or a home for at
2 "We shall therefore undertake to formulate general statements as to
what the 'law' of a given country 'can' or 'cannot' do in the way of attach-
ing legal consequences to situations and transactions by observing v.hat has
actually been done. In making our observations we shall, however, find
it necessary to focus our attention upon what courts have done, rather
than upon the description they have given of the reasons for their action.
Whatever generalizations we reach will therefore purport to be nothing
more than an attempt to describe in as simple a way as possible the
concrete judicial phenomena observed, and their 'validity' will be meazurcd
by their effectiveness in accomplishing that purpose. In other wor&,h
they will be true in so far as they enable us to handle effectively the con-
crete materials with which v.e must deal." Cook, The Logical and Lcgal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 Yu LAW JOUnN,,AL, 457, 460.
Professor Dewey in a discussion of Logical Method azd La' (1921) 10
CoRN. L. Q. 17, points out that the meaning and worth of general principles
are subject to inquiry to be made in the light of the conscquencez of the
use of those principles, and that the syllogism used in formal decisions
sets forth the results of thinking, but has nothing to do with the operation
of thinking.
Definitions of the legal requirements for change of domicil are perhaps
particularly unsatisfactory. ". . . definitions of domicil of choice are
usually defective. . . . Many of them are not properly definitions at all,
but mere formulae of evidence framed apparently for the purpoze of suc-
cinctly stating the most usual criteria by which domicil of choice is de-
termined." JACOBS, LAW OF D0nI=CIL (1SS7) § 68.
3For the different interpretations and rules applied in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Kentucky, the three states involved in the instant case,
see infa, notes 4, 5, 6, 7 and S.
Yale v. West Middle School Dist., 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 At]. 295, 290
(1890) (domicil distinguished from residence for purposes of admitting
child to school). For a similar Massachusetts holding see Kapigian v.
Krikor der Minasian, 212 Mass. 412, 413, 99 N. E. 264 (1912) (suit to
annul marriage); and for a similar Kentucky case see Staier's Admr's v.
Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 316, 319, 239 S. W. 40, 42 (1922) (action for
inheritance tax).
5 See Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 38 Conn. 689, 692, 92 Atl. 684, GSO
(1914) (action for divorce). For a similar Massachusetts case see Winans
v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 391, 91 N. E. 394, 396 (1910) (action for divorce).
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least an indefinite period in the new place.0 Sometimes the
Connecticut courts have required only a present intention to
make the new place of residence a home or domicil for the time
being7 and in a few cases the courts of other states have even
held that domicil, in the last analysis, is mainly a question of
fact and cannot be decided by the application of any fixed rule.,
The recent case of McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn.
169, 132 Atl. 902 (1926) shows to what lengths a court may
be driven to reach a sound result when the facts in the case are
unusual and the court deems itself obliged to apply a fixed rule
in regard to the acquisition of a domicil of choice. The plain-
tiff's husband left Massachusetts, his domicil of origin, intend-
ing never to return, and went to Kentucky on business with the
intention of remaining there indefinitely. He lived there nine-
teen years. While in Kentucky he married the plaintiff, who en-
trusted certain funds to him for investment purposes, which
funds he in good faith mingled with his own. Such mingling,
according to a Kentucky statute, destroyed the wife's legal
ownership. In order not to apply this statute to the distribu-
tion of the husband's estate, the Connecticut court held that the
husband, throughout his stay in Kentucky, remained domiciled
in Massachusetts. The court, in an attempt to justify its de-
cision, professed to follow the "Connecticut rule," which re-
quires for a change of domicil an intention to make the new
place of residence a permanent domicil, an actual residence in
the new place, and the intention to abandon the old domicil.
An examination of the Connecticut cases, however, does not
show the adoption of such a rule."
There are, then, in the several common law states not only
different requirements for the establishment of a domicil of
choice, but the courts in almost any single state will be found
to apply different rules when different problems arise. In cases
involving domicil, the courts seem to have gone exceptionally
far in recognizing, though tacitly, that, although fixed rules are
helpful guides in the general run of cases, when, in specific
cases, these same rules force socially unsound results, they must
6 Gold v. Gold, 100 Conn. 607, 124 Atl. 246 (1924) (protesting jurisdic-
tion of probate court). Likewise in Massachusetts. Emery v. Emery, 218
Mass. 227, 105 N. E. 879 (1914) (petition for proof of will).
7See Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 200, 82 Atl. 193, 194 (1912)
(vagrant intending to make home and domicil wherever he worked, held
to have changed his domicil from time to time accordingly). The Massa-
chusetts court held similarly in Wilbraham v. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587, 591
(1868) (action to recover money spent on pauper).
8 White v. Stowell, 229 Mass. 594, 119 N. E. 121 (1918) (protest against
jurisdiction of probate court) ; see Robinson v. Paxton, 210 Ky. 575, 580,
276 S. W. 500, 503 (1925) (same).
9 See cases cited supra notes 4, 5, 6, 7.
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yield. Such a view alone can explain the different rules which
have been applied by the courts of a single state where domicil
is to be established for different purposes, or where there is
a wide variation in the facts involved. Less is required to show
a change of domicil between states than between nations," and
some courts have refused to apply the "reverter doctrine" w here
a native citizen of another country has come to reside here and
has both acquired a domicil and renounced his original ,Ile-
giance.21 Query, whether the decision would have been the same
if it had been the case of an American who went abroad. The
liberal attitude of the courts in allowing a wife who has grounds
for divorce to acquire a domicil for other purpozes io based on
the social needs involved,'- as is the recognition that the require-
ments for a change of domicil should be more stringent for some
purposes than for others. It is only thus that one can explain
the failure of the courts to inquire as to the intention of a
person to remain, when he enters a state where there is a broad
divorce law, and seeks a divorce there as soon as the statutory
requirements for residence are fulfilled. In other instances, also,
a domicil of choice has been recognized even though some of the
usual requirements were lacking. Thus residence for a definite
period, as for completion of a college course, has been deemed
sufficient to establish a domicil for voting purposes,' 3 and a
soldier has been allowed a domicil although his residence was
for a definite and limited period."
In order to achieve this elasticity, there has been continuous
change in the concept of the intent wldch must accompany the
physical movement if a new domicil is to be recognized. 3 Owing
1 'Beale, Proof of Doiaicil (1926) 74 U. PA. L. REv. 552, 553; cf. Dupuy
v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556 (1S73).
12 In re Jones, 192 Iowa, 78, 182 N. W. 227 (1921).
12 (1920) 30 YAiL LAW JOURNAL, 631.
13 Welsh v. Shumway, 232 IlM. 54, 83 N. E. 549 (1907) ; Pedigo v. Grimes,
113 Ind. 148, 13 N. E. 700 (1887).
24 Ames v. Duryea, 6 Lansing, 155 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1S71).
15 The classical conception of intent in these cases is the intention to
abandon the old domicil with the concurrent intent to gain a new domicil.
(1919) 18 MliCa. L. REV. 332; JACOBS, op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 125, 126.
The courts have sometimes interpreted intent as the intention to remain
permanently. MINoR, CONFLICt OF LAws (1901) § 56. Or, as lach of in-
tention to return. Farrow v. Farrow, 162 Iowa, 87, 94, 143 N. W. 356, 859
(1913). Or, as intention to remain indefinitely without definite intention
of removal. MINoR, op. cit. svpra, § 61. Or, as intention to remain until
something indefinite happens. Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279 (1834).
Or, as intention to make a home. Beale, Vie Pr'ogrcss of thlc Law (1920)
34 HARV. L. REv. 50, 52; A=IRIC.N LAW INST TUT CoNFLICT OF LAwS ra -
STATEmNT No. 1. (1925) § 21 (intent required for acquisition of domicil
of choice is an intention to make a home in fact and not an intention to
acquire a domicil). Or, as intent to acquire a new domicil. Denny v.
Sumner County, 134 Tenn. 488, 184 S. W. 14 (1915).
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to the complexity of modern life, which spells instability of
residence for an increasing proportion of citizens, such a rule
is no longer practicable in America. It would deprive too many
individuals of privileges, which accompany legal residence, i.e.,
domicil, in a community, and deprive the community of the
rights which are correlative to the duties of a legal resident.
So if A were sent by his business house from state X, his
domicil of origin, to state Y with instructions to take from
five to ten years to develop a branch of the firm and then move
on to state Z to do the same thing, and so on, A could never
acquire a domicil, although his stay in each place might be for
a considerable time, although his family resided with him, and
although he considered himself a member of the community.
Likewise, where the rules of a church require that its ministers
move from parish to parish at intervals of possibly five years,
the ministers could never acquire a domicil of choice. Such ex-
amples might easily be multiplied. The majority of American
courts, therefore, have adopted a more liberal rule which re-
quires, for the establishment of a domicil of choice, intentional
abandonment of the old domicil and actual residence in the new
place with the intent to remain there indefinitely."'
The application of this more liberal rule would, in the instant
case, have required the Connecticut court to hold the plaintiff's
husband domiciled in Kentucky. Such a holding would have de-
prived the plaintiff of her property, which would have thus
become part of her husband's estate. The advantage of a fixed
rule for the acquisition of a domicil of choice is that it gives a
definite standard to the courts for a large majority of cases.
16 MINOR, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 61; STORY, CONFLICT or LAvS
(8th ed. 1883) 46; Winans v. Winans, supra note 5; Lucky v. Roberts, 211
Ala. 578, 100 So. 878 (1924); In re Titterington's Estate, 130 Iowa, 356,
106 N. W. 761 (1906); Nolker v. Nolker, 257 S. W. 798 (Mo. 1924);
Felker v. Henderson, 78 N. H. 509, 102 Atl. 623 (1917); Presson v.
Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 147 Pac. 1081 (1915); see Denny v. Sumner County,
supra note 15, at 475, 184 S. W. at 16; Hayward v. Hayward, 65 Ind. App.
440, 450, 115 N. E. 966, 970 (1917); United States v. Knight, 291 Fed.
129, 133 (D. Mont. 1923) (notwithstanding "vague floating intent or hopo
to some time return to former place"). The definition approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 624,
34 Sup. Ct. 442 (1914) (domicil for divorce) and in Gilbert v. David, 235
U. S. 561, 569, 35 Sup. Ct. 164, 167 (1915) (domicil for federal jurisdic-
tion) is that a change of domicil is effected where there is a change of
abode and "the absence of any present intention of not residing perma-
nently or indefinitely in the new abode." DicY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(3d ed. 1922) 113. The majority of Connecticut cases seem to favor the
rule which requires actual residence in the new place with the intention of
remaining at least indefinitely. Gold v. Gold, supra note 6; Gildersleeve
v. Gildersleeve, supra note 5; Fairfield v. Easton, 73 Conn. 735, 49 Atl.
200 (1901). See Roxbury v. Bridgewater, supra note 7, at 201, 82 At]. at
194; but of. Yale v. West Middle School Dist., supra note 4.
412
COMMENTS
But the certainty is limited,'17 and the fixed rule has serious dis-
advantages. In cases with unusual facts, it forces the court
either to make decisions which are socially undesirable, or in an
-effort to avoid such decisions, while still doing lip-service to the
fixed rule, to str-ain and distort the rule in order to reach a
sound result.
Even the application of the majority American "rule," requir-
ing only the intent to remain indefinitely, would not supply a
panacea for all difficult cases, and in the final analysis, it seems
that the courts will decide unusual cases in which the question
of domicil arises, chiefly on their specific facts. 2" Some courts
have squarely faced this issue.8  The Massachusetts Supreme
Court in 1840 declared that "No exact definition can be given of
domicil; it depends on no one fact or combination of circum-
stances, but from the whole taken together it must be deter-
mined in each particular case." 2. When doricil is thus recog-
nized as an artificial notion, developed to aid the courts in decid-
ing which of several laws to apply, the pragmatic test as to the
particular conception to be applied may seem less startling.
17 Ir. Beale, although a protagonist of the fixed rule as set forth in the
Restatement, recognizes that the certainty is limited, and says that Zub-
stantive rules for regulating domicil finally must rest on evidence of certain
facts, and as one of these is the mental attitude of the person concerned
it is difficult to establish. Beale, op. cit. svpra note 10.
18 "* however great the appearance of purely deductive reasoning
may be, the real decision where a case presents novel elements consists in
a re-defining of the middle term of the major and minor premises of the
syllogism; that is, of the construction or crcation of premiscs for the case
in hand, which premises did not pre-exist. . .. This view does not
lead to the discarding of all principles and rules, but quite the contrary.
It demands them as tools with which to work; as tools without which we
cannot work effectively. It does, however, make sure that they are
used as tools and are not perverted to an apparently mechanical use. It
points out that the use never can be really mcchanical; that the danger in
continuing to deceive ourselves into believing that we are merely 'applying'
the old rule or principle to a 'new case' by purely deductive reasoning lies
in the fact that as the real thought-process is thus obscured, we fail to
realize that our choice is really being guided by considerations of social
and economic policy or ethics, and so fail to take into consideration all the
relevant facts of life required for a wise decision." CooL-, op. cit. mupna
note 2, at 487.
19 See Robinson v. Paxton, nipra note 8; Pettit's Executri: v. Lexington,
193 Ky. 679, 237 S. W. 391, 393 (1922); Sears v. Boston, 1 M4et. 20.0, 251,
252 (Mass. 1840); cf. Winans v. Winans, svpra note 5.
20 See Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met. 242, 245 (Mlass. 1840).
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